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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) is one of the world´s leading donors in official development 
assistance (ODA) to give it a strong weight in the relationship with recipient partner 
countries, in particular with those that are more dependent on it.  Besides the material 
weight of its funding, the EU has retained historical ties and influence in diplomatic, 
political and economic terms in many of its ODA recipient partner countries (particular 
in Sub-Saharan Africa). Since the 2000s, the EU development policy has not only 
undergone major structural changes in its institutional framework but it has also started 
to face a new international aid scenario. The paper explores why a normative-based EU 
development policy is being challenged by reformed EU institutions and a new global 
order and how the EU is attempting to respond to this context in face of the EU deepest 
recession since the end of the Second World War.  
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INTRODUCTION 1 
The European Union (EU) is one of the world´s leading donors in official development 
assistance (ODA) to give it a strong weight in the relationship with recipient partner 
countries, in particular with those that are more dependent on it.2 Besides the material 
weight of its funding, the EU has retained historical ties and influence in diplomatic, 
political and economic terms in many of its ODA recipient partner countries (particular 
in Sub-Saharan Africa). Since the 2000s, the EU development policy has not only 
undergone major structural changes in its institutional framework but it has also started 
to face a new international aid scenario. The paper explores why a normative-based EU 
development policy is being challenged by reformed EU institutions and a new global 
order and how the EU is attempting to respond to this context in face of the EU deepest 
recession since the end of the Second World War.  
 
 
1. IN SEARCH OF A NEW EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
The EU has constructed its development policy largely on the discourse of moral 
responsibility and solidarity (European Commission, European Parliament & European 
Council, 2006). This discourse is centred on the idea of a normative or ethical power 
(Aggestam, 2008), which shifts its role in the world from a positive role model to a 
proactive promoter of ‘global public goods’. EU’s recurrent focus is on poverty reduction 
and social issues, which underpins a self-portrayal as the guardian of the interests of the 
poor. This development policy is supported by strong financial resources and an 
implementing bureaucracy based in Brussels and EU delegations around the world.   
The EU is a leading actor in the international aid architecture and its work is unique in 
the sense that, through the European Commission (EC), provides not only direct donor 
support  to recipient partner countries (in the form of grants, loans and equities) but also 
helps in the coordination of the development policy of its 28 Member States. This work 
is facilitated by the EU delegations present in 136 countries (OECD, 2012). The 
coordination and complementarity of the development policies of the EC and Member 
States are particularly important due to the strong financial resources it involves and the 
                                                          
1 The author is very grateful to Raquel Freitas (CIES-ISCTE) for all her fundamental contribution for this 
working paper. 
2 The definition of EU that is followed in the paper is the one set in the OECD DAC Peer Review 2012 
(OECD, 2012): “The EU is the legal successor to the European Community. The EU is an economic and 
political union of Member States (currently number 27) and has legal personality (…) The EU has a sui 
generis legal nature, and it is an individual donor in its own right, with its own development policy. Its 
legitimacy is dual, based on both the legitimacy of the governments of the Member States that are 
represented in the Council (i.e. indirect legitimacy) and the legitimacy of the European Parliament that is 
directly elected by EU citizens (i.e. direct legitimacy).”  The number of Member States increased to 28 in 
July 2013 as Croatia joined the EU.  
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potential development impact it can have if well implemented and managed by the EU. 
In 2010, the total aid provided by the EU (EC and Member States) reached more than 
USD 90 billion in 2010 making it the largest ODA donor (OECD, 2012).  
The EC has been seeking to design and implement a common EU development policy as 
a way to strengthen EU aid effectiveness, coordination and complementarity, to limit 
waste in resources, to avoid duplication, and to reduce the negative impacts. These are 
usually coordinated with other high-income donors in the context of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD-DAC), which has thus far been the main institutional framework for steering and 
monitoring the international aid agenda, in particular the aid effectiveness agenda. In 
recent years, increasingly associated with this agenda is the EU normative push and 
insistence on reforms in the area of good governance by recipient partners. The good 
governance focus is also linked to the increasing call to respect the principle of ownership 
which affirms that aid recipients should have the capacity to autonomously decide on 
their own development policies as set out by the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. While there were attempts since the late 1950s to produce a common 
development policy, it is only in the early 2000s that major efforts were undertook to 
come up with common EU development policy goals and principles (Carbone, 2010).  
The EU development policy can be analysed according to three periods. The first period 
(between the late 1950s to the mid-1980s) had the Lomé Convention (1975-2000) at the 
cornerstone of the EU development policy. This Convention regulated the relations 
between the EU and the so-called ACP Group (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) 
and it was described as a generous aid and trade programme under a “genuine 
partnership” where the involving parts were regarded as equals (Carbone, 2010). The 
Lomé Convention showed, in fact, an EU development policy that distinguished itself for 
its political neutrality and non-interference. The second period (between the late 1980s 
and late 1990s) is marked by the Maastricht Treaty that entered into force on November 
1993 leading the EU to take the first steps towards a common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP) as a way to increase the union´s role in the global stage. The EU development 
policy expanded beyond the ACP-based sphere to include all developing regions. This 
was also the period in which the EU decided to adopt the mainstream Washington 
consensus on development, i.e., primacy to economic over political conditions for the 
disbursement of aid. Additionally, the non-reciprocal trade regime applied to the ACP 
Group started to be challenged as it was incompatible with the World Trade Organisation 
rules (Carbone, 2010).  
Finally, since the early 2000s a series of agreements and documents have marked the 
entrance of the EU into a novel period. It begins with the Cotonou Agreement (2000-
2020) to replace and introduce important changes in the aid and trade procedures formerly 
set in the Lomé Convention. EU aid disbursement became conditional not only on a needs-
base but also according to performance in implementing jointly agreed country strategy 
papers (CSPs). Additionally, the EU began to push for new trade agreements or Economic 
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Partnership Agreements (EPAs) but this process remains unfinished and highly criticised 
in particular by African partner regions. Another change introduced in the Cotonou 
Agreement was the strengthening of the political dimension between the EU and the ACP 
Group through new issues such as security and migration (Carbone, 2013).   
The Agreement was followed in 2005 by the European Consensus on Development 
(European Commission, European Parliament and European Council, 2006) and the 2007 
Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour. While the former set 
common strategic norms (such as participation, political dialogue, partnership and 
ownership), objectives and plans of action for the EU development policy, the latter focus 
on EU better aid management calling on all Member States to concentrate their aid 
activities in a limited number of countries as well as on a limited number of sectors per 
recipient partner (European Commission, 2007). Both are regarded as turning points for 
EU coordination and complementarity in terms of development policy.  
On December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon, aimed at creating new institutions and legal 
instruments to fortify the EU external action, came into force to reshape the EU 
development policy (European Union, 2007). The treaty defines the respective 
competences of the EU institutions and Member States setting a complex legal and 
institutional framework for development cooperation and humanitarian aid, areas to be 
shared by the EU institutions and Member States. Development policy is now part of the 
EU´s areas of external action and development cooperation is clearly described in Articles 
208 to 211. In Article 208 it acknowledges (1) poverty fighting as the primary goal of EU 
development policy and (2) the need to strengthen the role of policy coherence for 
development (PCD) by the EU. PCD is a concept designed to maximise the positive 
impacts of policies for development by linking, for example, European immigration 
policy and development or climate change and development. This is expected to improve 
both the effectiveness and credibility of European development cooperation. 
The treaty created the new post of High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (FASP) (who is simultaneously vice-president of the European 
Commission) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to provide more strength 
and consistency to the EU global activities. Also at the European Commission, a new 
Directorate General for Development and Cooperation EuropeAid (or DG DEVCO) was 
set in January 2011 as a result of the merger of parts of the former Directorate General 
for Development and EuropeAid Cooperation Office. On its website it states that: 
“EuropeAid Development and Cooperation is responsible for designing European 
development policy and delivering aid throughout the world. EuropeAid delivers aid 
through a set of financial instruments with a focus on ensuring the quality of EU aid and 
its effectiveness. An active and proactive player in the development field, we promote 
good governance, human and economic development and tackle universal issues, such as 
fighting hunger and preserving natural resources” (European Commission, 2013). This 
move aims to make DG DEVCO a “one stop shop” for all stakeholders in the field of 
development cooperation. The treaty strengthened also the role of the European 
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Parliament, in particular budgetary powers, in monitoring and scrutinising the EU 
development policy.  
But as the latest European Union OECD DAC Peer Review (2012) states this attempt to 
strengthen the coordination and complementarity of EU development policy is far from 
achieved:  
”Despite progress, developing a cohesive approach to meeting development cooperation 
commitments and speaking with a unified voice in the international arena is still 
challenging. Internally, while the Commission has pushed Member States on a technical 
level to fulfil their EU commitments, political sovereignty of individual Member States 
limits its leverage. The Commission prepares progress reports and proposes practical 
measures to Member States but decisions are, of course, taken by Member States who 
decide in Council whether and how they will take on board the proposed measures. Once 
Council has taken a decision, Member States are expected to carry it out, and, if they fail 
to do so, the Commission may take action, including at the European Court of Justice. 
However, expectations are not always met, such as with the EU commitments to policy 
coherence for development, volume of aid and division of labour (…). In international 
negotiations it is sometimes difficult for the EU to present itself as a coherent bloc, which 
risks weakening its influence.”  
The OECD DAC Peer Review stresses also that the new institutional framework set by 
the Treaty of Lisbon raises “some associated risks” by building more complexity in the 
EU development policy implemented by the EEAS. While the EEAS (positioned outside 
the Commission but with its work completely under the Commission systems) has 
authority for the multiannual phase of development programming and works jointly with 
DEVCO, this DG remains responsible for managing the budget, designing and 
implementing the programme.  
Furthermore, the EC initiated a debate in 2010 on the future of EU development policy. 
Its proposal for a new policy, the Agenda for Change (European Commission, 2011b) 
was presented in October 2011 after extensive consultation and a series of changes to the 
document originally proposed, the Green Paper on EU development policy in support of 
inclusive growth and sustainable development (European Commission, 2010). Besides 
the Green Paper, a number of documents and processes were seen by member states as 
the starting point in a longer process towards the formulation of a new development 
policy. This new policy is also seen as an important instrument to enable EU development 
policy to go beyond aid (CONCORD, 2012). While these policy revisions were welcomed 
by most of those consulted as timely, given the existing budgetary pressures and the 
negotiations for the next seven-year financial financial framework (2014-2020), policy 
change in the EU context is a particularly slow process and there is little flexibility as 
approval requires the agreement of all member states.  
The Agenda for Change, which member states are now discussing, has emphasies two 
main pillars for EU development policy: (1) the promotion of human rights, democracy, 
rule of law and good governance and (2) the promotion of inclusive and sustainable 
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growth. It proposes four major shifts: more conditionality concerning good governance 
and human rights; a focus on growth and the role of the private sector; a new concept of 
differentiated development partnerships with new aid allocation criteria; increased 
coordination of EU policies. An essential part of the debate around this set of proposals 
is the issue of whether development objectives should be broadened to cover inclusive 
economic development, growth and employment creation or whether the focus should 
remain strictly on poverty reduction (HTSPE, 2011).  
On the first major shift, the European Parliament, as the guardian of the normative system 
and with a strong vetting power on the EU development policy following the Lisbon 
Treaty, has warned against the EU emulating the methods of such emerging donors like 
China, “since that would not necessarily be compatible with the EU's values, principles 
and long-term interests” (European Parliament, 2008) and voiced its support for 
conditionality in EU cooperation with its partners with regard to human rights and 
environmental standards. Despite the European Parliament’s normative discourse, many 
of the EU policies continue to undermine the EU move to build more policy coherence 
for development (PCD). While the focus was initially on more than ten policy areas, in 
the proposed Agenda for Change (European Commission, 2011b), PCD is related to 
global interests and only the security-development and migration-development links are 
emphasised. This reflects the tendency towards European self-interest/Europe’s own 
interests and securitarian concerns (Gibert & Bagayoko, 2009) and conflicts with the 
normative focus on needs-driven aid allocation and ownership. This modification reveals 
how the discourse seems to be following a reasoning of mutual benefit, in contrast to the 
previous approach that was much more paternalistic and anchored in the benefits that the 
developing countries had from EU cooperation. However, despite these tendencies on the 
part of the EC, the language of mutual interest was not taken up in the final document of 
the Agenda for Change, which postulates that the ground might not be ripe for such 
fundamental changes of the EU development policy. 
The second major shift in this Agenda for Change is the EU clear interest in engaging the 
private sector to promote sustainable and inclusive growth. This means an updating of the 
EU policies on private sector development that dates back to 2003 and a DG DEVCO 
with better knowledge management processes and expertise sharing with other EU 
Directorates General (OECD DAC, 2012). According to this proposal, the EU plans to 
use more ODA to mobilise private investment in developing countries. But as AidWatch 
2012, (CONCORD, 2012) that monitors and make recommendations on EU aid 
effectiveness, puts it when analysing the proposed Agenda for Change: “Few credible 
actions are envisaged to regulate private investment effectively in order to improve its 
social returns and overall development effectiveness, however, so the new focus on the 
private sector is likely to result in EU investors benefiting from EU aid, rather than poor 
countries benefitting from private investment.”  
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The third major shift proposed by the Agenda for Change introduces an attempt to 
differentiate development partnerships. The selection is to be based in four criteria: 
country needs, country capacity, country commitments and performance, and potential 
EU impact. The country´s commitment to and record on human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law, ability to conduct reforms and to meet the demands and needs of its people 
is to determine the ODA levels it may receive from the EU. This might have an impact 
on the reconsideration of ODA to countries that are emerging economies and graduating 
from Low (LIC) to Middle-Income Countries (MIC) and raises the question of how the 
EU can cut aid to influential emerging countries while working with them to address 
global challenges (Gavas, 2012).  
The last and fourth major shift focuses on increased coordination of EU development 
policy taking forward the idea of joint programming. The main goal of joint programming 
is to build a common framework to improve the harmonisation, coordination and division 
of labour of EU institutions and Member States´ development policies. The other 
expected positive effect is to improve recipient partner country´s ownership, alignment 
with national development plans and country systems as well as aid predictability. The 
EU has launched a pilot programme on joint programming in six countries (Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Laos, Mali and Rwanda) for the upcoming country programming 
period, 2014-2020 (CONCORD, 2012). The process is still in its early days so there is 
very little information on its actual impact so far.  
In summary, the EU development policy is currently undergoing important changes in 
operational terms (within EU institutions and between the EC and Member States) 
brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon and in terms of its future orientations. The driving 
force behind most this changing process seems to be more bureaucratic than political, and 
progress has been slow. The EU member states seem to lack true ownership of this 
normative setup led by the EC. It is still hard to see in practice a real common strategy 
based on a common identification of policy interests and priorities. There is also no clear 
articulation between the developmental and economic dimensions, which often means 
that economic policy and interests contradict and undermine development policy 
(Cornelissen, 2010).  Some EU Member States, however, do not seem to be shying away 
from putting aid and economic interests together in their development policies. Richard 
Moncrieff (2012) states clearly when analysing the former French presidency led by 
Nicolas Sarkzoy that: “French aid has been one of the support mechanisms of French 
commercial presence on the continent, whether formally through aid tied to commercial 
contracts, or informally since the ‘untying’ of French aid”. It is still too early to assess 
whether or not it has changed with the new Presidency led by François Hollande. The 
UK, under the Tory government led by David Cameron, has presented a new strategy for 
engagement with Africa. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is now expected 
to take the lead from the Department of International Development (DFID), which, over 
the past ten years, has dominated UK policy for Africa. This represents the recognition 
that development objectives will now be linked to UK interests on the continent, including 
trade (Cargill, 2011). Bayne (Bayne & Woolcock, 2011) argues that governments try to 
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reconcile three types of tension in economic diplomacy: between economics and politics; 
between international and domestic pressures; between governments and other forces. In 
the specific context of development policy we would include an additional tension, that 
is, between development aid norms and economic interests. While the cases of France 
and the UK show that some Member States seem to have moved away from that tension, 
the same cannot be said for the EU as a collective actor has it continues to strive to build 
a normative discourse for its development policy that separates economic interests from 
development concerns (even if the practice fails to match the discourse). The next section 
explores how the emergence of a new international aid arena is also impacting EU 
development policy and exposing its contradictions. 
 
 
2. FACING A NEW GLOBAL ORDER   
With the emergence of new donors from Latin America, Middle East and Asia, alternative 
models of development cooperation have been placed in the global aid agenda (Walz & 
Ramachandran, 2011, Mawdsley, 2012, Hackenesch & Janus, 2013). While many of the 
prosperous traditional OECD-DAC donors have been hit hard by the economic and 
financial crises of recent years, which has forced them to decrease their aid budgets, 
emerging donors like China, Brazil, India, Turkey or South Korea have increased their 
roles as aid donors and have already had a strong impact on the international aid 
architecture. The fundamental difference between the traditional and emerging donors 
lies in the fact that the latter regard themselves as interested parties in a mutually 
beneficial relationship with their development partner countries. They reject the notion 
that some countries are ‘donors’ and others ‘recipients’. These new actors, albeit with 
diverse approaches, are challenging the EU’s global weight and traditional leadership role 
as a donor and are stimulating a reconsideration of its development policies.   
Due to their different development models, these emerging donors tend to be less 
concerned with the normative discourse or the policy process of aid recipients and more 
focused on mutual economic gains from the relationship. In this scenario the principle of 
ownership takes on a different framework, where recipient countries have the status of 
equal partners: decisions are taken on the basis of projects or specific investments, with 
less scrutiny on macro-policy.  
It is possible to identify three major features in the way emerging donors design and 
implement their development policies (Smith, Yamashiro Fordelone et al, 2010, 
Mawdsley 2012). First, they like to state that they do not attach policy conditions to their 
development programs. They repeatedly claim not to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
partner countries and that they respect the principles of ‘national sovereignty’ and 
‘solidarity’. By presenting themselves in this way they differ from traditional donors, who 
tend to impose conditions in terms of macro-economic reforms and good governance. 
Secondly, emerging donors prefer to provide technical cooperation in the form of the 
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direct implementation of the projects agreed with partner countries. Traditional donors, 
on the other hand, seek to influence the beneficiary’s micro-management of development 
affairs and interfere in the policy process. Finally, emerging donors tend to provide 
financial support (concessional loans rather than grants) and trade access (Smith, 
Yamashiro Fordelone et al., 2010, ECOSOC, 2008). In contrast, traditional donors 
continue to offer long negotiations to allow access to their markets. This brings to the fore 
the difficulties that exist in the relationship between the EU and its development partners, 
difficulties that are closely related to the widely criticised imposition of development 
models and policy conditionality based on such imperatives as a good governance agenda.  
The 2011 Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness was a negotiation arena where these 
differences between traditional donors and emerging donors were confronted. The EU 
presented a weak position, reflecting a lack of leadership, and conceded many of the 
emerging donors’ demands in order to join the partnership and sign the document. This 
contrasted clearly with the leading role that the EU had played in the two previous High 
Level Foruns (HLFs) in Paris and Accra. As CONCORD, the European NGO 
confederation for relief and development, posits: “the European Union was a ghost at the 
global aid summit”(CONCORD, 2012a). The final document reflects the concessions to 
emerging donors and, hence, the shift from an aid effectiveness agenda to an effective 
development cooperation agenda, marked by the voluntary nature of the emerging 
donors’ commitments (Glennie, 2011). 
The declaration that came out from Busan (OECD, 2011), embodies a change in the logic 
behind the aid effectiveness agenda on four points. First, it moves from a focus on aid to 
one of cooperation and effective development. Second, it recognises the status of 
developing countries as de facto partners, as a way of acknowledging the mutual benefits 
of the partnership. Third, it decentralises the activities involving norm adaptation and 
monitoring to the field level and to other organisations that, in contrast to the OECD-
DAC, are not ‘donor-driven forums’. Finally, it establishes flexibility, enabling the 
involvement of emerging donors who do not agree with the norms developed in the 
context of the OECD-DAC. 
Unlike the approach undertaken by emerging donors that seems very clear and 
straightforward, there are three essential contradictions between the EU discourse and 
practice that create problems in the relationship with its partner countries and distort the 
political balance (Carbone, 2010a): (1) moral responsibility versus economic interests; 
(2) social agenda versus economic growth; and (3) ownership versus conditionality. 
 
2.1 Contradiction I: Moral Responsibility versus Economic Interests   
While the EU development policy has been built around a normative-based discourse, the 
frequent disjuncture between discourse and practice helps to undermine the standing of 
the EU vis-à-vis their partners. One example is tied aid or aid disbursement on the 
condition that it be used to procure goods or services from a specific country. This is 
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commonly view as leading not only to increasing costs in implementing a development 
project but also in administrative costs. By untying aid, donors are offering recipient 
countries to use their aid to procure goods and services from almost any country that offer 
better “value for money” and suit their needs. The EU likes to trumpet its efforts to ‘untie’ 
aid and claims to tie only about 10% of it (HTSPE, 2009) but much remains to be done 
in that regard as pointed out by a EURODAD 2011 report, the European Network on Debt 
and Development of 54 NGOS from 19 countries (EURODAD, 2011). Another example 
of the contradiction between the EU discourse and practice is provided by the ongoing 
EPAs negotiations and a key trade instrument within the Cotonou Agreement.  With the 
EPAs, the EU wants the ACP countries to open their doors to European goods and 
services in return for duty-free market to European consumer and commodities market. 
The negotiations started in 2002 and were expected to conclude in 2007. Instead, at the 
present date they are still in progress and none of the African regional communities has 
fully implemented an EPA. African leaders have argued that the EPAs will destroy their 
nascent industries and hamper the needed structural transformation of the economy by 
allowing the entrance of European goods and services. In September 2011, the European 
Commission announced that it intended to remove trade preferences by January 2014 in 
case of countries failed to ratify and implement their respective EPAs (Ramdoo & Bilal, 
2011). In an EPA Negotiations Coordination Meeting organised by the African Union in 
Arusha (Tanzania) between the 17th and 18th of May, 2012 to review and assess the current 
state of the negotiations, the African Union’s response was clear (African Union, 2012). 
Despite the European Commission´s announced plans, the meeting adopted the following 
recommendations among others:  
“ix. There is need for a rethink of EPA negotiations taking into account current 
developments and the rise of emerging economies. The new issues (geographical 
indications, investment, Trade and Environment, etc) that are being introduced in the 
negotiations should not be negotiated to ensure the interests of African countries are not 
compromised 
x. The African regions negotiating EPAs and the African Union should continue to 
collectively maintain their positions on the following: Most Favoured Nation (MFN), 
Export taxes, Safeguards, Rules of Origin, Non-Execution Clause, which are considered 
to be of critical importance to the development aspirations of regions and the continent 
as a whole”  
The emergence of new donors is expected to further enhance this contradiction as the EU 
tries to adjust its development policy in response to the continent´s financial and 
economic crisis. The impact of this crisis in the EU development policy can be seen in 
several ways: it has reduced the material weight of the EU in traditional spheres of 
economic and political influence; it has created pressure from the constituencies of donor 
governments to focus on achieving better results (‘value for money’), which sometimes 
entails more micro-management from donors; and it has meant a search for new sources 
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of income outside the EU by accessing new markets and resources within a growing 
global competition. 
 
2.2 Contradiction II: Social Agenda versus Economic Growth  
Given the colonial past of several of its member states, the EU has felt a moral obligation 
to push for poverty reduction as its main goal in terms of development policy and a focus 
on the achievement of the social-based Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In some 
respects, the EU acts as the conscience of governments that it regards to fail to prioritise 
the concerns of the poor and are instead more concerned with growth and the satisfaction 
of the interests of local elites. However, this does not necessarily improve the relationship 
between the EU and its partner countries with the latter frequently accusing traditional 
donors like the EU of micro-management and interference in their internal politics 
(Glenn, 2008; Faust, 2010). The EPA issue also reflects this second contradiction as the 
EU is seen has pushing for the implementation of a neo-liberal model of economic 
development and capitalism that are seen as responsible for the poverty in developing 
countries (Craig & Porter, 2006; Blunt, Turner et al., 2011). The EU appears to be trapped 
in its own ambivalence regarding the impact of its economic agenda in terms of social 
outcomes: on the one hand it asks for state deregulation and liberalisation, on the other 
hand it asks for a social focus on poverty issues. In general, the link between trade and 
development is becoming a key factor in defining the future European development 
policy. This is particularly evident for Africa. Europe is now seeing Africa as a potential 
market, as well as a source of natural resources. This is something new, as Africa did not 
weigh much in EU foreign investment. This business-oriented perspective will create 
challenges for the normative position but Europe will be forced to retain and enhance its 
influence in the face of the emerging donors’ models. 
While Africa is not traditionally a major trading partner for Europe, European countries 
remain among the major trade partners of the continent. Although China and the USA are 
ranked at the top, if EU countries were taken together they would far exceed the two 
leading partners (African Development Bank, 2011a). After 2004, the commercial ties 
between Africa and the EU increased rapidly, to fall back in the aftermath of the economic 
and financial crisis that hit Europe. For the past eight years, the value of non-EU trade in 
goods with Africa has risen substantially, with imports from Africa (mainly energy 
products) consistently higher than exports to it (especially machinery and transport 
equipment).  Between 2008 and 2009, the value of EU27 imports from Africa decreased 
by 33 % (from EUR 158 billion to EUR 106 billion), and EU27 exports to Africa fell by 
10 % (from EUR 119 billion to EUR 107 billion) (Eurostat, 2010).  
The growing aid ties between emerging donors, in particular China, with Africa are 
undoubtedly related to their needs in terms of the primary commodities required to feed 
their economic growth. However, the picture that seems to be emerging is that they are 
also tapping into the growing African consumer market and thus rivalling Europe and the 
US. A recent report from the Standard Bank (Freemantle and Stevens, 2012) shows that, 
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since 2008, Korea (+48%), India (+45%) and China (+38%), along with Malaysia, have 
been the leaders in consumer imports into Africa.  In contrast, the major European 
economies have struggled to compete with the new Asian competitors in the African 
market: Italy (-14.2%), Spain (-3.3%), Germany (-2.3%) and the U.K (-2.2%) have all 
lost consumer market share since 2008. 
The other novelty of emerging donors in Africa lies in the fact that they were especially 
timely in intervening in another sector that had been neglected by the Europeans and 
Americans, despite the fact that it was a priority for African countries: the building of 
large scale infrastructure projects on the continent. This has included the rehabilitation of 
roads and railways, the construction of new transport corridors and hydropower dams. 
These infrastructures are crucial to enabling the continent to transform the economic 
structure and build an industrial sector to benefit from growing regional and global trade 
markets beyond commodities.  Although emerging donors support poverty reduction 
policies, they are less doctrinaire on how to get there and steer clear of macro-economic 
policy-making (Walz & Ramachandran, 2011: 17-18). They pursue a strategy of non-
involvement, leaving the partner countries to decide on investment in social areas. 
Economic interaction is driven by a notion of gains on both sides, based on what is termed 
win-win partnerships. In short, the imposition of economic conditionalities enhances the 
ambivalence between interests and norms that brings unease to the relationship between 
the EU and its recipient partner countries. This contrasts with the behaviour of emerging 
donors, who develop looser relations and are not so intrusive. 
 
2.3 Contradiction III: Ownership versus Good Governance 
Finally, the increasing call for greater ownership of development policies by recipient 
partners is closely linked to the good governance agenda that has been pursued by the EU 
since the early 1990s. The concept, borrowed from the World Bank, emerged as one of 
the objectives of the EU development policy. This became more evident in the 
negotiations between the EU and the ACP Group leading to the Cotonou Agreement in 
2000. If the Lomé Convention (1975-2000) characterised itself for EU political neutrality, 
the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020) revealed a EC and Member States eager to have 
good governance included in the new accord (Carbone, 2010a). It was also at this point 
that the framework of aid effectiveness was established and reforms in the area of good 
governance came to be seen as a sine qua non condition for aid effectiveness and for the 
successful adoption of General Budget Support (GBS) as the preferred modality for 
disbursing aid among European donors and respect the principle of ownership. This 
modality implies that the country has transparent systems and that it has governance and 
accountability structures in place and in operation – ideally, for its citizens in the first 
place, though also for the donors. But, traditional donors, like the EU, have hesitated to 
provide it, in practice, due to the difficulties in ensuring good governance. This is 
particularly so when many developing countries are demonstrating solid economic 
growth but continued and sometimes even rising levels of poverty (Casse & Jensen, 
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2009). This problem is connected with the lack of democratic accountability to their 
citizens and parliaments. Traditional donors have insisted on democratisation and devised 
governance matrixes to try to ensure some level of accountability but they have resulted 
in further criticism of micro-management and interference in the internal affairs of 
developing countries (Carmody, 2008). This is also linked to the lack of focus on pro-
poor growth and the absence of redistributive policies in some developing countries, 
priorities that the EU has tried to stimulate. All these are seen as intrusive methods that 
are contrary to the commitment to the ownership of development policies.  
The EU seems to be aiming at revising its development policy on this issue with the 
adoption, in August 2006, of a new approach on “democratic governance” described to 
be “pragmatic” and based “on dialogue and capacity building”(Carbone, 2010a). This 
new EC communication presents particular features: (1) democratic governance is only a 
means towards poverty eradication as the main goal of EU development policy; (2) good 
governance cannot be imposed from outside in respect of the principle of ownership; (3) 
an understanding of good governance that goes beyond being a merely technocratic issue 
(focused mainly on the fight against poverty) to embrace a more holistic view that 
includes also issues like access to health, education and justice, pluralism in the media, 
parliament activities and the management of public budgets and natural resources; (4) 
harmonisation of EC and Member States approaches to good governance; and (5) 
launching of a new incentive-based mechanism (European Community Governance 
Incentive Tranche – ECGIT) to reward countries for their governance achievements. The 
reward would be offered following the production of a Governance Profile by the EC and 
an Action Plan by the recipient partner (Carbone, 2010a and European Commission, 
2013a). 
Yet, an independent study commissioned by the EC, in the end of 2010, to review the 
“democratic governance” initiative (external) has revealed its shortcomings (European 
Commission, 2013): “Limited ownership of the GI process; 2) insufficient alignment 
between the GI and already existing governance processes and plans in a given country; 
3) inflexibility of the tools; 4) political and institutional capacity constraints on both 
sides; 5) limited influence of the financial incentive alone; 6) insufficient harmonisation 
within the EU”. The study also proposed a series of recommendations: “1) support for 
democratic governance is to be embedded in local realities; 2) the role of regional or 
continental initiatives on governance; 3) engagement with civil society; 4) developing 
and enhancing existing local capacities; 5) rethink the incentives and conditionalities; 6) 
performance assessment; 7) flexibility and 8) strengthen harmonisation within the EU”.  
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3. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of new global economic powers (that are increasingly becoming donors), 
the changing multilateral aid architecture under pressure to offer more space and voice to 
developing countries  and  the  challenge to market-oriented economic models dominant 
in Europe and the US following the 2008 crisis can be highlighted as the main features of 
the international aid arena. These features have had an impact in the development 
discourse to one that “places more emphasis on mutual interest, global risks, global 
commons, and ‘beyond aid’ approaches” (ODI, 2013).  
With this new international aid landscape in place, the EU development policy is 
undergoing structural changes in its policy orientations and operationalization as 
mentioned above. It is too early to assess the impact of the changes but the EU seems to 
be now far from its instrumental role in shaping international development as it did in the 
early 2000s when it pushed for key global policy issues on financing for development, 
aid effectiveness and coordination and policy coherence for development.  The new 
institutional framework set by the Treaty of Lisbon seems to have generated mixed 
feelings. For the OECD-DAC, it represents an important step forward for the EU 
development policy as it seeks to build more coherence, complementarity and unity 
between the development work pursed by the EC and Member States. But others like 
CONCORD have warned that while development policy has been strengthened in the 
Treaty, the interpretation and implementation of the new provisions might lead it to be 
instrumentalised to pursued EU foreign policy goals (CONCORD, 2012a). 
The way this new institutional framework will be operationalized is crucial if the EU 
wants to manage strategic relationships in an increasingly crowded development aid 
landscape with a myriad of public and private actors to tackle global development 
challenges (ODI, 2013). As Humphrey (Humphrey, 2011a) stresses, there are two 
strategies that are particularly important to strengthen global governance and sufficiently 
meet these new challenges: (1) increasing the density of networks in order to create 
opportunities for interchange and the development of ideas and increasing the capacity of 
global institutions such as the G20 and (2) ceding space to emerging powers in 
international organisations such as the UN Security Council, the World Bank and the 
IMF. This, Humphrey argues, would not necessarily imply a loss of influence and would 
increase the effectiveness of the organisations. Two examples reveal, however, how 
difficult these strategic partnerships might be difficult to achieve for the EU within this 
new context. Carbone (2011) shows how the existence of three competing visions and 
goals within the EU (European Commission, European Parliament and Member States) 
clashed to negatively affect the opportunity to constructively engage with China, the 
newest leading and rising global donor. Helly (2013), assessing the EU-Africa 
partnership, argues that a growing “continental drift” is in the making due to the 
limitations and inefficacies (now under review) of the 2007 Joint Africa Europe Strategy.  
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The EU likes to be perceived as a normative power, but the need to accommodate the 
different views and goals of a bloc, far from being monolithic, ultimately undermines its 
leadership in attempting to shape international development policies. This is particularly 
clear in the bloc´s leading countries that run their own foreign policy, with still significant 
differences in their approaches to the new and challenging global order and a dominant 
tendency to return to the principle of “national interest” rather than that of convergence 
in the EU foreign policy. Since the end of the 2000s, the ongoing structural changes in 
the EU institutional framework and the emergence of a new international aid scenario 
reveals a volatile EU development policy that is failing to match discourse with practice. 
In consequence, the EU seems to be now losing credibility and capability to engage with 
partner countries that are increasingly turning to new emerging donors. 
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